News 21 May 2026

🐑 Can sheep bells constitute an unreasonable nuisance ? Court of Cassation, Third Civil Chamber, 21 May 2026, Case No. 24-10.569 Characterisation of abnormal neighborhood disorder : In a judgment delivered on 21 May 2026, the French Court of Cassation ruled on the reasoning of a court of appeal that had found the use of bells on animals to constitute an abnormal neighborhood disorder. The appellants argued that, in the context of the return of wolves to the region and the threat these predators pose to livestock, the use of sheep bells was necessary to protect biodiversity, which serves the public interest and contributes to the objective of sustainable development. They therefore contended that the ringing of the bells could not constitute an abnormal neighbourhood disorder. The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal, holding that the court of appeal had provided sufficient reasoning by finding that the bells attached to the animals constituted an abnormal neighbourhood disorder because the flock was already adequately protected by the presence of guard dogs, which provided sufficient protection against predation attempts and theft in the sheepfolds. The court also noted that the continuous ringing of the bells could not be regarded as a characteristic sound of the region’s rural environment. Court of Cassation, Third Civil Chamber, 21 May 2026, Case No. 24-10.569

News 17 June 2026

⚖️ Amendment to a matrimonial regime not recorded in the margin of the marriage certificate : can the tax authorities be regarded as a third party? Court of cassation, commercial chamber, 17 June 2026, Case No. 25-10.143 In a judgment handed down on 17 June 2026, the Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation clarified that the tax authorities cannot rely on the absence of a note in the margin of the marriage certificate regarding a duly effected amendment to the matrimonial regime in order to set aside its effects. In this case, spouses had amended their marriage contract to include a preciput clause (a clause allowing the surviving spouse to take certain community assets before the estate is divided). Two years later, the wife passed away, leaving behind her husband, their three children, and three grandchildren. After the inheritance tax return had been filed, the tax authorities issued a reassessment notice and added back into the taxable estate the surrender value of two life insurance policies that had been transferred to the surviving spouse pursuant to the preciput clause. The corresponding inheritance tax was subsequently assessed. After their administrative appeal was rejected, the heirs brought proceedings against the tax authorities seeking relief from the additional inheritance tax, together with the related interest and penalties. The Court of Appeal dismissed their claim, holding in particular that the tax authorities, acting on behalf of the State, should be regarded as a third party within the meaning of Article 1397 of the French Civil Code. It therefore concluded that the amendment to the matrimonial property regime was not enforceable against the tax authorities because it had not yet been recorded in the margin of the marriage certificate. In its decision, the Court of Cassation held that, pursuant to Articles 720 and 1397 of the French Civil Code and Article 750 ter of the French General Tax Code, “where spouses have validly amended their matrimonial property regime to include a preciput clause, withdrawals made by the surviving spouse from the community property under that clause must be taken into account in determining the composition of the deceased’s estate for the purpose of assessing inheritance tax, regardless of the date on which the amendment was recorded in the margin of the marriage certificate.” Implicitly, the Court of Cassation ruled that the State is not a third party for the purposes of Article 1397 and that the amendment to the matrimonial property regime is enforceable against the tax authorities regardless of when it was recorded in the margin of the marriage certificate. The Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision, expressly criticizing its reasoning that the State should be regarded as a third party. Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed that the amendment to the matrimonial property regime was fully enforceable against the tax authorities, which were required to take it into account when determining the taxable estate. This ruling reinforces the principle that taxation must reflect the parties’ actual legal situation, reaffirming the objective nature of French tax law. Court of cassation, Commercial Chamber, 17 June 2026, Case No. 25-10.143

News 3 June 2026

Right to Be Forgotten and Fundamental Rights Court of cassation, first civil chamber, june 3, 2026 No. 25-14.228 📰 Right to be forgotten : how should the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data be balanced against the fundamental right to freedom of information ? This was the question before the First Civil Chamber of the French Court of Cassation in a judgment delivered on June 3, 2026, which further clarifies the Court’s case law on the subject. A former executive of a football club had been criminally convicted in 2009 for misappropriating public funds intended to promote grassroots sports. In 2011, the Court of Appeal reduced his sentence and, among other measures, ordered that the conviction not be entered in Bulletin No. 2 of his criminal record. These judicial proceedings were reported in an online newspaper article that remained accessible more than ten years after the events. In 2020, the former executive brought proceedings against the newspaper, asking the court primarily to order the removal of the article, alternatively to anonymize it, and, as a further alternative, to de-index it from search engines. In its judgment, published in the official Bulletin, the Court of Cassation gave a detailed response to the arguments raised by the claimant. It relied on Articles 10 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9 of the French Civil Code, Articles 11 and 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and applied Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In light of these provisions, the Court reaffirmed that the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression enjoy equal status. The Court held that any request to alter archived online journalistic content requires judges to balance these competing rights of equal value by reference to the seven criteria established by the European Court of Human Rights in Hurbain v. Belgium (July 4, 2023, No. 57292/16, §205). It also confirmed that the burden of proving the seriousness of the alleged interference rests with the claimant. Regarding the request for removal of the article, the Court found that the Court of Appeal had properly carried out the required balancing exercise, “without reversing the burden of proof or misconstruing the legal effect of exempting a conviction from inclusion in Bulletin No. 2 of the criminal record.” As to the request for anonymization, the Court of Appeal had observed, among other things, that the information retained a legitimate public interest because it contributed to the public debate on the relationship between money and sport. It further held that identifying the former executive by name was an essential component of the information and that mentioning his identity and criminal convictions fell within the scope of the public’s right to information and freedom of expression. The Court of Cassation therefore concluded that the Court of Appeal had correctly found that, in the circumstances of the case, the public’s right to information outweighed the former executive’s right to the protection of his private life, and had accordingly conducted the required balancing of the competing interests. French Court of Cassation (First Civil Chamber), June 3, 2026, No. 25-14.228

News 24 June 2026

🔎Artistic Freedom of Expression and the Protection of the Right to respect for One’s Voice Court of cassation, first civil chamber, 24 june 2026, case n° 25-20.483 In a judgment delivered on 24 June 2026, the French Court of Cassation clarified the limits of artistic freedom of expression and, for the first time, recognized the voice as an attribute of personality protected under Article 9 of the French Civil Code. In July 2021, a song questioning the discriminatory role of physical appearance as a factor in professional success was released. The song incorporated controversial extracts from an interview given on a web radio station by an author, journalist, and specialist in French chanson, concerning the importance of artists’ physical appearance. The appeals brought before the Court raised two questions. First, the Court had to determine whether a person’s voice is protected under the right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the French Civil Code and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Second, if so, it had to decide whether the use of controversial public statements in a musical work, responding to a public debate on discrimination based on physical appearance, contributed to a matter of general public interest. On the first issue, the First Civil Chamber ruled, on the basis of Article 9 of the French Civil Code and Article 8 of the Convention, that a person’s voice constitutes an attribute of personality, just like their image. Consequently, the right to respect for one’s voice must be balanced against the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On the second issue, applying the proportionality test that has now become well established, balancing the competing rights and giving precedence to the one that proves most legitimate in the circumstances of the case, the Court quashed the appeal judgment for having ruled that no debate of general public interest existed, even though the disputed statements had sparked significant public controversy and concerned an important social issue. By recognizing, for the first time, the right to respect for one’s voice, this decision also reaffirms the importance of protecting artistic freedom of expression, particularly where artistic works contribute to a debate of general public interest. Court of cassation, First Civil Chamber, 24 June 2026, Case No. 25-20.483

News, 24 June 2026

⚖️ Unfair Competition : Causation cannot be presumed Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, June 24, 2026, Case No. 25-12.787 In a ruling dated 24 June 2026, the Commercial Chamber of the French Court of Cassation reaffirmed that, in matters of unfair competition, a causal link between the wrongful conduct and the alleged diversion of customers must be established in order to obtain compensation for the resulting loss. In June 2017, two employees of a market research institute resigned from their positions as Associate Director and Research Director to join a competing market research firm. The two employees were alleged to have solicited clients on behalf of their future employer while they were still employed by their former company. The original institute claimed that the competitor had unlawfully poached its employees and diverted its customers, arguing that these acts constituted unfair competition. The French Court of Cassation was therefore asked to determine whether the Court of Appeal could award damages for the alleged loss of customers solely on the basis of conduct deemed unfair, without establishing that such conduct had in fact resulted in the diversion of those customers. 📌 The Commercial Chamber did more than simply reiterate the requirement to establish causation. It overturned the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, finding that it had merely assumed that the unfair conduct was necessarily the cause of all the alleged customer losses. The Court thus emphasized that, in unfair competition cases, unfair conduct can justify an award of damages only if it is proven to have caused the diversion of customers for which compensation is sought. Such proof must be provided in respect of each customer concerned. Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, June 24, 2026, Case No. 25-12.787

News 24 June 2026

⚖️ Unfair commercial practices: the Court of Cassation clarifies the scope of the concept of “commercial practice” Court of cassation, commercial chamber, 24 june 2026, case n° 24-16.770 In a ruling dated 24 June 2026, the Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation provides clarification on the scope of the concept of commercial practice within the meaning of Articles L. 121-1 et seq. of the French Consumer Code. 📌 A company organized a competition called “Customer Service Award of the Year.” Two other companies organized a competition awarding the trophy “Best Customer Relations of the Year.” The first company sued the second company, believing that these contests constituted unfair business practices. They sought an injunction against these practices and damages. The Paris Court of Appeal dismissed the claims, ruling that the design and awarding of the trophies were not directly related to the promotion, sale, or supply of a product to consumers. Upholding the Court of Appeal’s analysis, the Commercial Chamber first recalls that, under Article L. 121-1, paragraph 2, of the Consumer Code, a commercial practice is deemed unfair if it is contravenes to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer who is reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant, and reasonably circumspect with regard to a good or service. It further states that, according to the established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting Article 2(d) of Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005, transposed into Articles L. 121-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code, only the practices which, on the one hand, are of a commercial nature, meaning that they originate from professionals, and, on the other hand, are directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of their products to consumers, constitute “commercial practices”. The High Court concludes that “since the conduct of a professional, acting in their own name and on their own behalf, is not directly related to the promotion, sale, or supply of their own products to consumers, it cannot be classified as a commercial practice vis-à-vis consumers, within the meaning of Directive 2005/29 and Articles L. 121-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code.” In the present case, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that the design and awarding of the trophies by the defendant companies were not directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of their own products or services to consumers. The Commercial Chamber therefore finds that these practices do not constitute commercial practices as defined in Articles L. 121-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code, and dismisses the appeal. Finally, the Court rules that a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling is unnecessary, as the established case law of the Court “is sufficient to resolve the legal issue in question, even in the absence of strict identity between the issues”. Court of cassation, commercial chamber, 24 june 2026, case n° 24-16.770

News, 24 June 2026

⚖️ Defective product liability: the French Court of Cassation reverses its case law on the starting point of the limitation period Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, June 24, 2026, Case No. 25-12.697 In a judgment delivered on 24 June 2026, the French Court of Cassation interpreted Article 1245-16 of the French Civil Code, which transposes Article 10(1) of Council Directive 85/374/EEC, concerning the limitation period applicable to claims based on liability for defective products. 🔹 In 2022, a patient who claimed to have suffered adverse side effects from a medicinal product since 2005 brought proceedings against the pharmaceutical manufacturer, seeking a medical expert assessment to evaluate the harm allegedly suffered. As the manufacturer argued that the claim was time-barred, the Court of Appeal declared the action inadmissible, holding that the limitation period had expired. The question referred to the Court of Cassation was whether the three-year limitation period set out in Article 1245-16 of the Civil Code runs from the date on which the bodily injury is medically consolidated, or from the date on which the victim knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the damage, the defect in the product, and the identity of the producer. In answering this question, the Court first recalled that, under Article 1245-16 of the Civil Code, an action for compensation based on liability for defective products is time-barred after three years from the date on which the claimant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the damage, the defect in the product, and the identity of the producer. The Court then referred to its previous case law, under which, in cases of bodily injury, the victim was deemed to have knowledge of the damage on the date on which the injury was medically consolidated (First Civil Chamber, 5 July 2023, Appeal No. 22-18.914; published). Finally, the First Civil Chamber relied on a recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, 26 March 2026, Case C-338/24, LF v Sanofi Pasteur) to reverse its previous case law, holding that: “It must therefore now be held that the starting point of the limitation period under Article 1386-17 (now Article 1245-16) of the Civil Code is the date on which the claimant knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of both the damage – which had clearly emerged in connection with the defective product, irrespective of its subsequent development – and the defect in the product and the identity of the producer.” In this case, the lower courts had found that the patient already had, as of 2008, all the information necessary to trigger the running of the limitation period. He was aware of the symptoms he had experienced and their connection with the medicinal product, of the alleged defect relating to the product’s addictive nature, which could make withdrawal difficult, and of the identity of the producer. As the action had been brought after the three-year limitation period had expired, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. Drawing the consequences of the CJEU’s recent interpretation, the First Civil Chamber accordingly abandoned its previous approach of postponing, until medical consolidation, the running of the limitation period for actions seeking compensation for bodily injury. Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, June 24, 2026, Case No. 25-12.697

News, June 18, 2026

⚖️ Lapse of a notice of appeal: the French Supreme Court condemns excessive formalism Court of Cassation, 2nd Civil Chamber, June 18, 2026, Case No. 23-18.170 In a judgment delivered on 18 June 2026, sitting as a Section Formation and published in the Official Bulletin, the Second Civil Chamber of the French Supreme Court (“Cour de cassation”) clarified the drafting requirements applicable to the operative part (“dispositif”) of appellate submissions. 📌 In the present case, the appellant’s submissions, filed within the time limit prescribed by Article 908 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, did not expressly seek the reversal (“infirmation”) or setting aside (“annulation”) of the first-instance judgment. They nonetheless requested that the judgment be “rendered null and void” (“mettre à néant”) and invited the Court of Appeal to reconsider the challenged heads of the judgment. The Court of Appeal held that these submissions failed to contain an express application for the reversal or annulment of the judgment and, on that basis, declared the notice of appeal to have lapsed (“caducité de la déclaration d’appel”). The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the absence of the terms “reversal” or “annulment” from the operative part of the submissions necessarily results in the lapse of the notice of appeal, despite it being clear from both the submissions and the notice of appeal that the appellant seaks reversal of the judgment. The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. It held that requiring the exclusive use of the terms “reversal” or “annulment”, on pain of the notice of appeal being declared lapsed or the judgment being affirmed, constitutes excessive formalism. 🔎 In reaching this conclusion, the Court first recalled the provisions of Article 954 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. That provision requires that the parties’ claims be set out expressly in the operative part of their submissions. The Court of Appeal is therefore bound to rule only on those claims. The Court further held that, “even in the absence of the terms ‘reversal’ or ‘annulment’, if the wording of the operative part of the submissions, read in conjunction with the notice of appeal where necessary, shows that the appellant seeks reversal or annulment of the judgment, the Court of Appeal must find that such a claim is properly before it.” In the present case, the operative part of the submissions requested that the judgment be “rendered null and void” and invited the Court of Appeal to rule afresh on specifically identified claims. Additionally, the notice of appeal limited the challenge to certain operative provisions of the first-instance judgment. The Supreme Court held that these elements necessarily established that the appellant sought reversal of those provisions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that “the Court of Appeal had applied excessive formalism and thereby infringed the relevant provisions by failing to find that the claim for reversal had been properly brought before it.” 📚 This ruling is part of the evolving case law of the Second Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, which takes into account the requirements established by the European Court of Human Rights regarding excessive formalism to ensure compliance with Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. Court of Cassation, 2nd Civil Chamber, June 18, 2026, Case No. 23-18.170

News, 24 June 2026

🔎 Prohibition on leaving french territory without the consent of both parents : The Court may limit the measure to the parent who presents a risk of non-return Court of Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, July 1, 2026, Case No. 25-21.064 In a judgment delivered on 1 July 2026, the French Court of Cassation clarified that Article 373-2-6 of the French Civil Code allows the court to limit a prohibition on a child leaving French territory to the parent who presents a risk of failing to return the child. In this case, the Family Court had ordered that two children could not leave France without the authorization of both parents. It reasoned that, although the risk of non-return concerned only the mother, the travel restriction could only operate on a bilateral basis and therefore had to apply equally to the father. The French Court of Cassation was asked to determine whether a prohibition on leaving French territory may be limited to the sole parent who presents a risk of non-return. The First Civil Chamber answered yes. Relying on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 2§2 and 3 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement), the Court held that the travel restriction, as defined in Article 373-2-6 of the Civil Code constitutes an interference with both the right to respect for family life and the freedom of movement. Therefore, this measure must be necessary and proportionate to the goal of preventing non-return and breaking ties with the other parent. Consequently, it is up to the judge to evaluate the measure of prohibiting the children from leaving the territory based on the risk of non-representation that each parent presents. This decision clarifies that a prohibition of leaving French territory is not necessarily bilateral: it can now be individualized when the circumstances demonstrate that only one parent poses a risk of non-representation. Court of Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, July 1, 2026, Case No. 25-21.064